Research

Job Market Paper

The launch of a NOAA satellite.

Reassessing China's Rural Reforms: The View from Outer Space, with Joel Ferguson. [Latest Draft]

Abstract: We study one of the central reforms in China’s economic miracle, the Household Responsibility System (HRS), which decollectivized agriculture starting in 1978. The HRS is commonly seen as having significantly boosted agricultural productivity—but this conclusion rests on unreliable official data. We use historical satellite imagery to generate new measurements of grain yield, independent of official Chinese statistics. Using a difference-in-discontinuities design, we find no causal evidence that provinces that adopted the HRS sooner experienced faster grain yield growth. These results challenge our conventional understanding of decollectivization, land reform, and the origins of the Chinese miracle.

Working Papers

The Distribution of Power: Decentralization and Favoritism in Public Infrastructure, with Catherine D. Wolfram, Susanna B. Berkouwer, Felipe Vial, Eric Hsu, and Edward Miguel. Submitted. [Latest Draft (June 2024)] [Online Appendix]

Abstract: Political favoritism can harm economic growth by distorting public investment. But how can researchers identify political bias without observing government objectives? Using granular infrastructure and electoral data, we leverage an institutional feature of Kenya’s nationwide electrification program: a pre-existing transparent allocation formula. Despite constitutional reforms decentralizing fiscal expenditures, pro-government areas received 46% more electrified villages and 35% more household connections than allocated by the formula. Favoritism was exerted by national offices—not Members of Parliament or local construction managers. The benefits of central coordination, technical capacity, and economies of scale may expose infrastructure to continued political capture despite decentralization.

Land Reform in Taiwan, 1950-1961: Effects on Agriculture and Structural Change, with Jen Kuan Wang. [Latest Draft (July 2024)]

Abstract: Using two instrumental variables strategies, we study Taiwan’s landmark 1950s land reform, long seen as central to its growth miracle. Phase II of reform redistributed formerly Japanese public lands, reducing tenancy, boosting rice yields, and pulling labor from manufacturing back to agriculture. By contrast, phase III, which reduced tenancy by breaking up larger estates, did not increase agricultural productivity and pushed labor out of agriculture. Phase II likely increased yields by lifting crop choice constraints, while phase III may have created farms too small to be economically viable. These differential results complicate traditional favorable narratives of Taiwan’s reform.

Work in Progress

Privilège Exorbitant? The Developmental Effects of the CFA Franc, with Abdoulaye Cissé and Joel Ferguson.

Publications

Money or Power? Choosing Covid-19 Aid in Kenya, with Susanna B. Berkouwer, Pierre Biscaye, Eric Hsu, Kenneth Lee, Edward Miguel, and Catherine D. Wolfram. Energy Economics. 2023. 127(B)107036. [Journal version] [Working paper] [IGC Blog Post] [PEDL Blog Post]